
英偉達(Nvidia)在上周發布的投資者報告中,公布了2026財年全年創紀錄的2159億美元營收,以及第四季度超市場預期的681億美元營收。在這份報告里,首席財務官評述中的短短幾行字,甚至讓部分密切跟蹤該公司的觀察人士都感到意外。
首席財務官科萊特·克雷斯在預先準備的聲明中表示:“自2027財年第一季度起,我們將把股票薪酬支出納入非公認會計準則財務指標。股票薪酬是我們薪酬體系的基礎組成部分,旨在吸引并留住全球頂尖人才。”
這聽起來或許只是財務領域的細枝末節,實則是一項備受矚目的舉措。與眾多科技公司一樣,英偉達歷來在發布基于公認會計原則(GAAP)的業績的同時,將股票薪酬支出從所謂的“調整后”財務數據中剔除。這類調整后的數據(即市場熟知的非公認會計準則指標),尤其是企業的每股收益(EPS),通常是華爾街評估企業業績表現、制定下一季度目標的依據。
包括沃倫·巴菲特在內的批評人士一直認為,盡管剔除股票薪酬的做法完全合規,但此舉會低估企業真實的人力成本,夸大盈利能力。但眾多企業堅稱,剔除該項支出,能夠讓投資者更準確地了解公司核心業務表現:按照他們的邏輯,股票薪酬并非現金支出,且外部分析師很難在估值模型中精準預測每個季度該項支出的總額。
顯而易見的是,同一公司的財報會因為股票薪酬的會計處理方式而呈現不同結果——有時甚至可以將賬面虧損轉變為“調整后利潤”。以軟件公司Asana為例,該公司最近公布第四季度凈虧損為3220萬美元,但剔除股票薪酬成本、員工股票交易薪資稅及其他項目后,其“非公認會計準則凈利潤”為1990萬美元。
作為全球市值最高(市值4.4萬億美元)的企業,英偉達的人員招聘、大幅加薪以及股權增值,正在持續推高其股票薪酬支出。更不必提及,當前人工智能領域人才競爭異常激烈,使得招聘市場的競爭進入白熱化階段。英偉達的股票薪酬支出從2025財年的約47億美元攀升至2026財年的64億美元,漲幅達35%。與此同時,其股價也大幅上漲,僅過去一年漲幅就達60%,不過在上周最新財報發布后,股價小幅回落。
正因如此,英偉達宣布從本季度起將股票薪酬納入非公認會計準則核算的做法才如此令人意外。
“首先,我要贊揚貴公司將股票薪酬納入非公認會計準則的做法?!盡elius合伙人兼科技研究主管本·萊茨在上周的財報電話會議上對英偉達管理層表示,“我認為這是明智之舉?!?/p>
粉飾財報的紅利已然消失
但英偉達為何要主動放棄這種能夠美化業績的會計手段呢?
佛羅里達大學(University of Florida)的榮譽退休教授杰伊·里特稱,英偉達的盈利能力極強,剔除股票薪酬支出對其業績的美化效果已經微乎其微。里特在郵件中說:“對英偉達而言,剔除股票薪酬支出對業績的影響微乎其微,這主要得益于其利潤規模極為龐大。一家企業的真實盈利能力越強,就越不需要粉飾財務數據?!?/p>
例如2020年,剔除股票薪酬后,英偉達基于非公認會計準則核算的年度營收,較基于公認會計準則核算的營收高出28.3%。而到了2025年,同樣的操作僅可以使其營收高出4.7%。
現任佛羅里達大學尤金·布里格姆金融、保險與房地產學院(Eugene Brigham Department of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate)IPO項目主任的里特指出,2025年英偉達稅后利潤約為1160億美元,員工總數4.2萬人,人均創造利潤約300萬美元,即便計入人均15萬美元的股票薪酬支出,對這一數據的影響也幾乎可以忽略不計。
雖然說將股票薪酬納入核算,能夠讓英偉達在幾乎不影響業績的前提下博取華爾街的好感,但其競爭對手卻未必可以做到這一點。
周一,Melius的分析師萊茨發布了一份研究報告,深入分析了英偉達的這一會計政策調整。據該機構分析,將股票薪酬支出納入核算在“七巨頭”(Magnificent Seven)企業中實屬常規操作,這一調整使得英偉達與Alphabet、亞馬遜(Amazon)、蘋果(Apple)及微軟(Microsoft)的對比分析更為直觀。相較于其他半導體企業,英偉達脫穎而出。
萊茨及其合著者在報告中指出:“若投資者迫使英偉達的半導體行業競爭對手效仿其做法,將股票期權支出計入非公認會計準則每股收益,英偉達將擁有顯著優勢?!睋﨧elius分析,若將該項支出納入非公認會計準則每股收益核算,博通(Broadcom)、超威半導體(AMD)和Marvell等公司的每股收益將下降14%至20%,而英偉達的每股收益降幅僅為約3%。
萊茨等人還寫道:“此外,如果這些同行迫于投資者壓力縮減股票薪酬開支,英偉達在人才招聘和收購式招聘方面就將更具優勢。因為與同行相比,其股權授予成本更易消化?!?/p>
當被問及英偉達此次調整會計政策的動機時,該公司僅讓《財富》雜志參考其官方文件。
巴菲特長期以來的不滿
英偉達的這一調整,恰恰觸及了伯克希爾-哈撒韋董事長巴菲特數十年來一直抨擊的薪酬體系設計結構性問題。需要明確的是,伯克希爾并未持有英偉達的股票。其最新年報顯示,伯克希爾的核心持倉為蘋果、美國運通(American Express)、可口可樂(Coca-Cola)和穆迪(Moody’s),持倉規模約達2980億美元。但巴菲特一直在直言不諱地批評其他公司高管薪酬的設計與實踐。在1992年致股東的信中,巴菲特寫道,以股票薪酬屬于估算金額為由,將其從利潤中剔除,這一理由至少可以說是難以令人信服。
巴菲特寫道:“股東應當明白,企業向另一方提供有價值的標的時就會產生成本,而不是等到現金流轉時才會產生成本。此外,僅僅因為一項重要成本無法精確量化,就拒絕將其納入財務核算,這種做法既愚蠢又虛偽。”
2018年,他指出,華爾街銀行家和企業首席執行官們公布的“調整后息稅折舊攤銷前利潤”指標,剔除了“諸多切實存在的成本”。
巴菲特寫道:“企業管理層有時聲稱,公司的股票薪酬不應計入費用?!彪S后以調侃的口吻說:“不然還能是什么呢——股東的饋贈嗎?”(財富中文網)
譯者:中慧言-王芳
英偉達(Nvidia)在上周發布的投資者報告中,公布了2026財年全年創紀錄的2159億美元營收,以及第四季度超市場預期的681億美元營收。在這份報告里,首席財務官評述中的短短幾行字,甚至讓部分密切跟蹤該公司的觀察人士都感到意外。
首席財務官科萊特·克雷斯在預先準備的聲明中表示:“自2027財年第一季度起,我們將把股票薪酬支出納入非公認會計準則財務指標。股票薪酬是我們薪酬體系的基礎組成部分,旨在吸引并留住全球頂尖人才。”
這聽起來或許只是財務領域的細枝末節,實則是一項備受矚目的舉措。與眾多科技公司一樣,英偉達歷來在發布基于公認會計原則(GAAP)的業績的同時,將股票薪酬支出從所謂的“調整后”財務數據中剔除。這類調整后的數據(即市場熟知的非公認會計準則指標),尤其是企業的每股收益(EPS),通常是華爾街評估企業業績表現、制定下一季度目標的依據。
包括沃倫·巴菲特在內的批評人士一直認為,盡管剔除股票薪酬的做法完全合規,但此舉會低估企業真實的人力成本,夸大盈利能力。但眾多企業堅稱,剔除該項支出,能夠讓投資者更準確地了解公司核心業務表現:按照他們的邏輯,股票薪酬并非現金支出,且外部分析師很難在估值模型中精準預測每個季度該項支出的總額。
顯而易見的是,同一公司的財報會因為股票薪酬的會計處理方式而呈現不同結果——有時甚至可以將賬面虧損轉變為“調整后利潤”。以軟件公司Asana為例,該公司最近公布第四季度凈虧損為3220萬美元,但剔除股票薪酬成本、員工股票交易薪資稅及其他項目后,其“非公認會計準則凈利潤”為1990萬美元。
作為全球市值最高(市值4.4萬億美元)的企業,英偉達的人員招聘、大幅加薪以及股權增值,正在持續推高其股票薪酬支出。更不必提及,當前人工智能領域人才競爭異常激烈,使得招聘市場的競爭進入白熱化階段。英偉達的股票薪酬支出從2025財年的約47億美元攀升至2026財年的64億美元,漲幅達35%。與此同時,其股價也大幅上漲,僅過去一年漲幅就達60%,不過在上周最新財報發布后,股價小幅回落。
正因如此,英偉達宣布從本季度起將股票薪酬納入非公認會計準則核算的做法才如此令人意外。
“首先,我要贊揚貴公司將股票薪酬納入非公認會計準則的做法?!盡elius合伙人兼科技研究主管本·萊茨在上周的財報電話會議上對英偉達管理層表示,“我認為這是明智之舉?!?/p>
粉飾財報的紅利已然消失
但英偉達為何要主動放棄這種能夠美化業績的會計手段呢?
佛羅里達大學(University of Florida)的榮譽退休教授杰伊·里特稱,英偉達的盈利能力極強,剔除股票薪酬支出對其業績的美化效果已經微乎其微。里特在郵件中說:“對英偉達而言,剔除股票薪酬支出對業績的影響微乎其微,這主要得益于其利潤規模極為龐大。一家企業的真實盈利能力越強,就越不需要粉飾財務數據?!?/p>
例如2020年,剔除股票薪酬后,英偉達基于非公認會計準則核算的年度營收,較基于公認會計準則核算的營收高出28.3%。而到了2025年,同樣的操作僅可以使其營收高出4.7%。
現任佛羅里達大學尤金·布里格姆金融、保險與房地產學院(Eugene Brigham Department of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate)IPO項目主任的里特指出,2025年英偉達稅后利潤約為1160億美元,員工總數4.2萬人,人均創造利潤約300萬美元,即便計入人均15萬美元的股票薪酬支出,對這一數據的影響也幾乎可以忽略不計。
雖然說將股票薪酬納入核算,能夠讓英偉達在幾乎不影響業績的前提下博取華爾街的好感,但其競爭對手卻未必可以做到這一點。
周一,Melius的分析師萊茨發布了一份研究報告,深入分析了英偉達的這一會計政策調整。據該機構分析,將股票薪酬支出納入核算在“七巨頭”(Magnificent Seven)企業中實屬常規操作,這一調整使得英偉達與Alphabet、亞馬遜(Amazon)、蘋果(Apple)及微軟(Microsoft)的對比分析更為直觀。相較于其他半導體企業,英偉達脫穎而出。
萊茨及其合著者在報告中指出:“若投資者迫使英偉達的半導體行業競爭對手效仿其做法,將股票期權支出計入非公認會計準則每股收益,英偉達將擁有顯著優勢?!睋﨧elius分析,若將該項支出納入非公認會計準則每股收益核算,博通(Broadcom)、超威半導體(AMD)和Marvell等公司的每股收益將下降14%至20%,而英偉達的每股收益降幅僅為約3%。
萊茨等人還寫道:“此外,如果這些同行迫于投資者壓力縮減股票薪酬開支,英偉達在人才招聘和收購式招聘方面就將更具優勢。因為與同行相比,其股權授予成本更易消化。”
當被問及英偉達此次調整會計政策的動機時,該公司僅讓《財富》雜志參考其官方文件。
巴菲特長期以來的不滿
英偉達的這一調整,恰恰觸及了伯克希爾-哈撒韋董事長巴菲特數十年來一直抨擊的薪酬體系設計結構性問題。需要明確的是,伯克希爾并未持有英偉達的股票。其最新年報顯示,伯克希爾的核心持倉為蘋果、美國運通(American Express)、可口可樂(Coca-Cola)和穆迪(Moody’s),持倉規模約達2980億美元。但巴菲特一直在直言不諱地批評其他公司高管薪酬的設計與實踐。在1992年致股東的信中,巴菲特寫道,以股票薪酬屬于估算金額為由,將其從利潤中剔除,這一理由至少可以說是難以令人信服。
巴菲特寫道:“股東應當明白,企業向另一方提供有價值的標的時就會產生成本,而不是等到現金流轉時才會產生成本。此外,僅僅因為一項重要成本無法精確量化,就拒絕將其納入財務核算,這種做法既愚蠢又虛偽?!?/p>
2018年,他指出,華爾街銀行家和企業首席執行官們公布的“調整后息稅折舊攤銷前利潤”指標,剔除了“諸多切實存在的成本”。
巴菲特寫道:“企業管理層有時聲稱,公司的股票薪酬不應計入費用。”隨后以調侃的口吻說:“不然還能是什么呢——股東的饋贈嗎?”(財富中文網)
譯者:中慧言-王芳
Tucked neatly inside the investor materials Nvidia produced last week to show its record full fiscal year 2026 revenues of $215.9 billion and a fourth-quarter revenue beat of $68.1 billion were a few lines in the chief financial officer’s commentary that caught even some close observers of the company by surprise.
“Beginning in the first quarter of fiscal 2027, we will include stock-based compensation expense in our non-GAAP financial measures,” chief financial officer Colette Kress noted in her prepared commentary. “Stock-based compensation is a foundational component of our compensation program to attract and retain world-class talent.”
It may sound like a bit of financial minutiae, but it’s actually a notable move. Like a lot of tech companies, Nvidia has historically left stock-based compensation out of what are called the “adjusted” financial figures it publishes along with its official GAAP results. Those adjusted figures—particularly a company’s earnings-per-share number—are known as non-GAAP figures, and they are typically the ones Wall Street uses to assess performance and set targets for the next quarter.
Critics, including Warren Buffett, have long argued that leaving out stock-based compensation, while perfectly legal, understates a company’s true cost of paying employees and inflates profitability. But many companies insist they’re giving investors a more accurate snapshot of the business’s core performance by removing the expense: Stock-based pay isn’t cash, the logic goes, and it can be difficult for outside analysts to properly estimate the total each quarter in their valuation models.
What’s clear is that the same company’s financial results can look different depending on how stock-based compensation is accounted for—sometimes even turning a bottom-line loss into an “adjusted profit.” Consider software maker Asana, which recently posted a net loss of $32.2 million in its fourth quarter, but announced “non-GAAP net income” of $19.9 million by removing the cost of stock compensation, payroll tax on employee stock transactions, and other items.
For $4.4 trillion Nvidia, the world’s most valuable company, hiring plus hefty pay increases and equity gains are driving up the cost of stock-based compensation. Not to mention, there is quite a bit of competition out there for AI-related talent, which has made the hiring landscape incredibly competitive. The price tag for Nvidia’s stock-based comp rose from roughly $4.7 billion in fiscal 2025 to $6.4 billion in fiscal 2026, a 35% jump. Meanwhile, the stock price has risen dramatically, up 60% over the past year alone, although it took a small tumble following its latest earnings release last week.
That’s what made Nvidia’s announcement that it would include stock compensation beginning in the current quarter so surprising.
“First, let me say kudos on including the stock-comp in non-GAAP,” Ben Reitzes, partner and head of technology research at Melius, said to Nvidia’s management during the company’s earnings call last week. “I think that’s a great move.”
The thrill is gone
But why is Nvidia voluntarily forfeiting an accounting maneuver that helps companies gussy up their results?
According to University of Florida professor emeritus Jay Ritter, Nvidia has gotten so profitable that excluding stock compensation cost doesn’t really provide that much of a benefit anymore. “For Nvidia, it is amazing how little difference it makes, largely because of how big their profits are,” Ritter said via email. “The better a company’s true profits, the less it needs to massage the numbers.”
In 2020, for example, excluding stock-based compensation allowed Nvidia to report non-GAAP annual operating income that was 28.3% higher than its GAAP operating income. Doing the same thing with Nvidia’s 2025 results, however, provided only a 4.7% boost.
Ritter, now the director of the IPO Initiative in the Eugene Brigham Department of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate at the University of Florida, noted that with roughly $116 billion in after-tax profits and 42,000 employees in 2025, Nvidia’s roughly $3 million profit per employee is barely affected by including stock-based compensation of $150,000 per employee.
And if including stock-comp expenses lets Nvidia score brownie points with Wall Street without much sacrifice, the same cannot be said of all its competitors.
Melius analyst Reitzes followed up on Monday with a research note analyzing the Nvidia accounting change. According to the firm’s analysis, including stock-based expenses is standard among Magnificent Seven stocks, which makes it a little easier now to compare Nvidia with Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft. But compared with other semiconductor stocks, Nvidia got a glow up.
“If investors force Nvidia’s competitors in semis to follow its lead and include stock-option expenses in non-GAAP [earnings per share], Nvidia has distinct advantages,” Reitzes and his coauthors wrote in their note. Including the expense in non-GAAP earnings would lead to a 14% to 20% hit to EPS at companies including Broadcom, AMD, and Marvell, according to Melius. Nvidia’s hit is about 3%.
“Also, if these peers need to rein in stock comp due to investor pressure, Nvidia would have an advantage in recruiting talent and completing acqui-hires since the impact of these grants are so easily absorbed vs. peers,” Reitzes and others wrote.
When asked about what motivated Nvidia to make the change at this time, the company directed Fortune to its official filings.
A long-running Buffett beef
The change Nvidia made aligns with a structural compensation design issue that appeared to irk Buffett, now chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, for decades. To be clear, Berkshire does not own stock in Nvidia. It holds some $298 billion with its core holdings in Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola, and Moody’s, according to its latest annual report. But Buffett has long listed his kvetches with executive compensation design and practices at other companies. In his 1992 chairman’s letter, Buffett wrote that the justification for backing out stock-based compensation because it was an estimated figure was underwhelming, to say the least.
“Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party and not just when cash changes hands,” Buffett wrote. “Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can’t be quantified with pinpoint precision.”
In 2018, he wrote that Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs were presenting “adjusted Ebitda” measures that excluded “a variety of all-too-real costs.”
“Managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense,” Buffett wrote, before quipping parenthetically: “What else could it be—a gift from shareholders?”