
“四分之一人生危機”是千禧一代提出的概念,指年輕人在向成年過渡時所經歷的那段充滿焦慮、迷茫與自我懷疑的時期。2001年,亞歷山大?羅賓斯和艾比?威爾納在其著作《四分之一人生危機:二十多歲的獨特挑戰》(Quarterlife Crisis: The Unique Challenges of Life in Your Twenties)中首次將這一概念引入公眾視野。當時,人們對這一概念褒貶不一,例如,凱蒂?庫里克對此持懷疑態度,而奧普拉?溫弗瑞則表示感同身受。
Z世代對這種感受可謂是無比熟悉。從與職業倦怠的長期斗爭,到對職業發展秉持務實甚至懷疑的態度,這群在“躺平”時代踏入職場的年輕人已然成為“四分之一人生危機”的鮮活案例。然而,有沒有可能這只是一種新常態,亦或“中年危機”正像撥號上網、柯達膠卷等其他20世紀標志性事物一樣會逐漸消失呢?有沒有可能Z世代陷入集體“四分之一人生危機”的背后確實存在宏觀經濟層面的合理原因呢?
美國國家經濟研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)一篇頗具爭議的工作文件也提到了上述現象:如今年輕人的“絕望感”水平遠高于中年人和老年人,這顛覆了長期以來“心理絕望與年齡呈駝峰形關系”的代際規律。簡而言之,在過去,人們本應在中年時期充滿絕望,而非青春期或成年初期。達特茅斯學院(Dartmouth College)與格拉斯哥大學(University of Glasgow)的經濟學家戴維?布蘭奇弗勞爾,以及倫敦大學學院(University College London)的亞歷克斯?布賴森明確表示:這無疑是在告訴人們,傳統意義的中年危機“消失”了。
相反,他們發現“四分之一人生危機”確實存在,如果按照歷史標準衡量,Z世代正深陷困境(不過研究中并未使用“四分之一人生危機”這一術語)。研究人員在報告中寫道,年輕人心理健康水平的下降“在12—25歲人群中尤為明顯,年輕女性更是如此”。此外,布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森的研究之所以能在該領域眾多相關研究中脫穎而出,關鍵在于它率先將年輕人的絕望感與勞動力市場動態進行了直接關聯。布賴森指出,目前該研究僅作為討論稿發布,尚未經過同行評審。
在回復《財富》置評請求時,布蘭奇弗勞爾表示自己的研究結果令其 “震驚不已”:“年輕勞動者貌似突然遇到了大麻煩。”這位經濟學家表示,自己此前“基本上從未聽說過‘四分之一人生危機’這類表述”,但如果此前知道的話,他“很可能會使用這個術語”。不過,他坦誠地說:“如今,無論從絕對層面還是相對層面來看,年輕人的處境都更糟了……[過去,] 人們的幸福感在中年時期會有所下降,但現在一切都變了。”
在另一場采訪中,布賴森也認為,從年輕人正面臨重大問題這一角度來看,研究結果確實支持“四分之一人生危機”的觀點。他引用了研究中一段帶有推測性但引人深思的表述:“在人生的這個階段,當人們試圖打拼事業、穩步前行、購置房產,以及追求所有那些‘階梯式’目標時,現實卻與他們的期望背道而馳。”
布賴森補充說:“可能對部分年輕人而言,當他們在攀爬階梯時,似乎有人抽走了梯子上的腳踏橫木。”目前他尚未看到有研究能直接佐證這一感受。
布賴森表示,他們發現“勞動者的心理健康狀況始終優于非勞動者…… 但年輕人的情況發生了巨大變化。如果只看年輕群體,那么勞動者的心理健康狀況比非勞動者更差”。他解釋說,他們發現40歲以上人群并未出現這種情況,“但40歲以下人群正面臨這個問題,而且在非常年輕的25歲以下群體中,這種現象更為嚴重”。
布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森引用了簡?滕格的研究:“年輕人的職業道德本身已大幅下滑”,同時也參考了安妮?凱斯和安格斯?迪頓提出的“絕望之死”(Deaths of Despair)理論。這兩項研究都是21世紀人類福祉危機領域頗具影響力的發現。在接受《財富》雜志采訪時,兩人還提到了喬納森?海特的研究,后者認為智能手機成癮與青少年抑郁存在關聯;布蘭奇弗勞爾還引用了哈佛大學教授羅伯特?帕特南在世紀之交提出的著名觀點:美國人“獨自打保齡球”的現象與日俱增。
布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,他曾與帕特南探討過為什么社會孤立問題變得愈發嚴重,這個問題在2000年被人們首次發現。“實際情況是,人們根本不再去打保齡球,不再去泳池游泳,不再約會,不再有性生活,不再參與各類社交活動……局面已經失控。”布蘭奇弗勞爾呼吁人們關注當下的狀況:“我認為這個問題的潛在影響是巨大的、長期的,且具有全球性。”
走出“駝峰”困境
從歷史上來看,美國人群的心理絕望(通常表現為抑郁癥狀、持續悲傷或絕望感,以及普遍的心理困擾)呈“駝峰形”曲線變化:在成年初期逐漸上升,中年時期達到峰值,之后在晚年逐漸下降。然而,布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森名為《美國年輕勞動者絕望感上升》(Rising Young Worker Despair in the United States)的研究發現,自20世紀90年代以來,這個規律發生了根本性改變。布蘭奇弗勞爾對《財富》說:“如今,這條曲線呈下降趨勢,即絕望感隨年齡增長而降低。”
1993—2023年的《行為風險因素監測系統》(BRFSS)、2008—2023年的《全國藥物使用與健康調查》(NSDUH),以及多項大型全國性調查均證實,在職年輕人群體的絕望感正大幅上升。這意味著,總體而言,勞動者年齡越小,出現心理困擾的案例就越多。如今,絕望感并非在中年達到峰值,而是隨年齡增長穩步下降。
布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,這一發現讓他尤為震驚,因為就在2021年,他還發表過一篇論文,將中年危機的“駝峰形”規律描述為“社會科學領域全球最重要的規律之一,至少在它失效前是這樣”。
美國國家經濟研究局的這份論文指出,盡管年輕勞動者面臨的困擾不斷加劇,但原本中年時期出現的絕望感“駝峰”,如今僅存在于失業或無法工作的美國人群體中;家庭主婦、學生和退休人員的絕望感則保持平穩。這表明,當前危機主要集中在年輕勞動者群體中,它并非是一種能夠對所有年齡段人群都產生同等影響的普遍趨勢。
研究人員在報告中寫道:“如今心理絕望感正隨年齡的增長而下降,原因在于40歲以下勞動者,尤其是25歲以下勞動者的心理健康狀況近期出現了下滑。”不同數據源和年齡段人群均出現了這一上升趨勢,但在女性和在職人群中尤為顯著,失業或經濟活動參與度低的人群則未出現這一情況。
大衰退的陰影仍在?
盡管該論文主要證實了這一趨勢的存在及其變化幅度,并未明確其確切原因,但它指出了可能導致這一現象的更廣泛社會經濟因素:就業不穩定性的加劇、勞動者工作掌控權和自主權的減弱、技術變革加速與職場數字化監控趨嚴、工資漲幅相對生活成本停滯不前,以及集體議價能力減弱。穩定就業傳統預期的破滅,加上“零工經濟”不穩定性的上升,亦可能讓年輕勞動者感到格外脆弱,甚至陷入絕望。
布賴森對《財富》說,盡管“有些人并不認同”,但他們的研究顯示,年輕勞動者絕望感的上升“始于大衰退結束后不久”,具體在2012至2014年期間。批評者認為,社會對心理健康話題抵觸情緒的降低,導致調查數據中絕望感水平的上升,但布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森引用了一系列確鑿數據作為反駁,例如自殺率上升、進食障礙住院人數增加、肥胖率攀升以及社交退縮現象加劇,這些都是年輕人真正感到絕望的有力證據。布賴森說:“目前有行為可以佐證‘年輕人心理健康狀況一直在下滑’這一核心觀點。”
當被問及這一現象與 “勞動力市場滯后效應”(由奧利弗?布蘭查德和拉里?薩默斯在1986年一篇具有開創性的論文中提出)是否存在相似性時,布賴森表示認同,并透露他也曾使用過這一術語。布蘭查德和薩默斯的其中一個共識在于,失業(尤其是經濟衰退后的失業)可能會留下“永久性創傷”。布賴森補充道,他還對其他與主觀幸福感相關的“創傷效應”產生了興趣,例如出生在經濟衰退時期,或父母出生在經濟衰退時期可能帶來的影響。(彼得森國際經濟研究所所長亞當?波森最近在彭博社Odd Lots播客中指出,盡管 “滯后效應”和“勞動力市場創傷”受到廣泛關注,但很多經濟學家在大衰退后的數據分析中并未發現相關證據。)
美國銀行全球研究部(Bank of America Global Research)會定期關注失業趨勢,包括年輕勞動者的失業情況。該機構近期對美國人口普查局(U.S. Census Bureau)數據的分析顯示,年輕勞動者的失業率始終高于平均水平,更值得關注的是,2022年以來,應屆畢業生的失業率已超過整體失業率。美國銀行研究所(Bank of America Institute)對年輕勞動者的處境進行了更全面的解讀:“全球約有 2.89億年輕人既未通過工作積累職業經驗,也未通過參與教育或職業培訓項目提升技能,他們的經濟收入也因此受到了制約。”

此外,斯坦福大學開展了一項由頂尖人工智能研究員埃里克?布林約爾松主導的開創性研究。研究結果顯示,自2022年末以來,年輕人群被招聘到高度人工智能自動化崗位的比例有所下降。美國人力資源管理協會(SHRM)的年度心理健康調查也提供了佐證。該協會首席人力資源官吉姆?林克向《財富》透露,他們并未將其定義為 “勞動者絕望”,而是稱之為“職場幸福感”。調查顯示,除2021年因“疫苗帶來的喜悅”出現的一次性提升外,其余年份中,約67%的勞動者稱自己的幸福感較疫情前有所下降。林克補充道:“如果是年輕人,他們的幸福感評分會更低。”
駝峰變成“勾”
布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,盡管他研究這一課題已有多年,但此前并未發現這種可追溯至20世紀90年代的趨勢,一方面是因為數據不夠完整,另一方面是他曾以為這是與疫情相關的臨時現象。然而,在閱讀了簡?滕格的一篇采訪后,他重新梳理了數據。結果,他驚呼“‘天啊’……很明顯,這一趨勢在2020年前就已出現,新冠疫情顯然起到了推波助瀾的作用,但我認為人們此前并未意識到這一點”。
這一發現促使他在2024年與布賴森、徐曉偉(音譯)共同參與了美國國家經濟研究局的論文。在論文中,他們首次將已然確立的中年危機“駝峰形”規律,與2019年后年輕人絕望感激增的現象進行對比。數據圖表不再呈現 “駝峰” 形態,而是更像一個倒置的對勾,在最左側達到峰值后向右逐漸下降。布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,正是這張美國數據圖表,促使聯合國主動與他取得聯系,隨后邀請他參與全球范圍內的絕望感問題研究。

英國的佐證數據同樣觸目驚心。布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,各個學科領域花了不少時間才達成了一致的數據口徑,例如,醫療從業者傾向于用“心理健康”描述這一問題,而經濟學家則更常用“幸福感”,但“在痛苦感數據中,這一趨勢始終十分明顯”。在研究團隊提出了精準的調查問題之后,即“過去30天里,自己心理健康狀況不佳的日子有多少?”,結論變得確鑿無疑。布蘭奇弗勞爾說,由此生成的數據圖表 “讓我震驚不已”。

布賴森指出,按照所學,經濟學家會用工作產生的金錢性回報(金錢和非金錢經濟收益)來衡量工作的好壞,而心理學家以及越來越多的行為經濟學家會采用“工作價值”這一概念,也就是某種無法僅用經濟收益來衡量的東西。在接受《財富》采訪時,他提到了以“需求層次理論”而聞名的亞伯拉罕?馬斯洛,并指出“人的幸福感與自我實現高度相關”,而自我實現意味著自己有能力去追求那些能定義自身價值的目標。在我們所處的社會中,對很多人而言,這種能力完全取決于工作”。布賴森表示,“可想而知”,年輕人群工作崗位質量的下降正對其幸福感產生顯著影響,但他也補充說,由于缺乏進一步的研究,這個觀點仍屬于推測。
有趣的是,這兩位作者指出,年輕勞動者心理健康下滑并非源于工資的下降。事實上,年輕人與年長者的工資比率有所上升,實際工資也在增長。然而,其他成本的上漲導致了絕望感,例如住房、醫保的相對價格,以及學生債的攀升。與此同時,年輕人的健康狀況也在惡化,社會孤立和肥胖問題愈發嚴重,自殺率持續上升。無獨有偶,自21世紀10年代中期以來,各類主流調查數據均顯示年輕人的心理健康狀況在不斷惡化。布蘭奇弗勞爾向《財富》透露,如排除工資不滿或失業這兩個因素,我們可以得出一個結論:年輕勞動者本質上是在表達“這份工作很差”。
美國國家經濟研究局的這項研究傳遞出一個重要信號,而且也引發了聯合國的高度重視:全球年輕勞動者正處于危機之中,絕望感從中年群體向青年群體轉移,這既是公共衛生緊急事件,也是經濟緊急事件。布蘭奇弗勞爾證實,達特茅斯學院與聯合國將于10月底在新罕布什爾州聯合舉辦一場研討會,喬納森?海特、羅伯特?帕特南等學者將作為嘉賓出席。
布賴森還向《財富》提出了另一個推測:年輕人對自身職業前景充滿懷疑,而這種懷疑在很大程度上是合理的。“當下的時代有其特殊性……目前,尤其是年輕人,正遭到一系列問題的沖擊,這意味著他們無法像前幾代人那樣有把握。”(財富中文網)
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
“四分之一人生危機”是千禧一代提出的概念,指年輕人在向成年過渡時所經歷的那段充滿焦慮、迷茫與自我懷疑的時期。2001年,亞歷山大?羅賓斯和艾比?威爾納在其著作《四分之一人生危機:二十多歲的獨特挑戰》(Quarterlife Crisis: The Unique Challenges of Life in Your Twenties)中首次將這一概念引入公眾視野。當時,人們對這一概念褒貶不一,例如,凱蒂?庫里克對此持懷疑態度,而奧普拉?溫弗瑞則表示感同身受。
Z世代對這種感受可謂是無比熟悉。從與職業倦怠的長期斗爭,到對職業發展秉持務實甚至懷疑的態度,這群在“躺平”時代踏入職場的年輕人已然成為“四分之一人生危機”的鮮活案例。然而,有沒有可能這只是一種新常態,亦或“中年危機”正像撥號上網、柯達膠卷等其他20世紀標志性事物一樣會逐漸消失呢?有沒有可能Z世代陷入集體“四分之一人生危機”的背后確實存在宏觀經濟層面的合理原因呢?
美國國家經濟研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)一篇頗具爭議的工作文件也提到了上述現象:如今年輕人的“絕望感”水平遠高于中年人和老年人,這顛覆了長期以來“心理絕望與年齡呈駝峰形關系”的代際規律。簡而言之,在過去,人們本應在中年時期充滿絕望,而非青春期或成年初期。達特茅斯學院(Dartmouth College)與格拉斯哥大學(University of Glasgow)的經濟學家戴維?布蘭奇弗勞爾,以及倫敦大學學院(University College London)的亞歷克斯?布賴森明確表示:這無疑是在告訴人們,傳統意義的中年危機“消失”了。
相反,他們發現“四分之一人生危機”確實存在,如果按照歷史標準衡量,Z世代正深陷困境(不過研究中并未使用“四分之一人生危機”這一術語)。研究人員在報告中寫道,年輕人心理健康水平的下降“在12—25歲人群中尤為明顯,年輕女性更是如此”。此外,布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森的研究之所以能在該領域眾多相關研究中脫穎而出,關鍵在于它率先將年輕人的絕望感與勞動力市場動態進行了直接關聯。布賴森指出,目前該研究僅作為討論稿發布,尚未經過同行評審。
在回復《財富》置評請求時,布蘭奇弗勞爾表示自己的研究結果令其 “震驚不已”:“年輕勞動者貌似突然遇到了大麻煩。”這位經濟學家表示,自己此前“基本上從未聽說過‘四分之一人生危機’這類表述”,但如果此前知道的話,他“很可能會使用這個術語”。不過,他坦誠地說:“如今,無論從絕對層面還是相對層面來看,年輕人的處境都更糟了……[過去,] 人們的幸福感在中年時期會有所下降,但現在一切都變了。”
在另一場采訪中,布賴森也認為,從年輕人正面臨重大問題這一角度來看,研究結果確實支持“四分之一人生危機”的觀點。他引用了研究中一段帶有推測性但引人深思的表述:“在人生的這個階段,當人們試圖打拼事業、穩步前行、購置房產,以及追求所有那些‘階梯式’目標時,現實卻與他們的期望背道而馳。”
布賴森補充說:“可能對部分年輕人而言,當他們在攀爬階梯時,似乎有人抽走了梯子上的腳踏橫木。”目前他尚未看到有研究能直接佐證這一感受。
布賴森表示,他們發現“勞動者的心理健康狀況始終優于非勞動者…… 但年輕人的情況發生了巨大變化。如果只看年輕群體,那么勞動者的心理健康狀況比非勞動者更差”。他解釋說,他們發現40歲以上人群并未出現這種情況,“但40歲以下人群正面臨這個問題,而且在非常年輕的25歲以下群體中,這種現象更為嚴重”。
布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森引用了簡?滕格的研究:“年輕人的職業道德本身已大幅下滑”,同時也參考了安妮?凱斯和安格斯?迪頓提出的“絕望之死”(Deaths of Despair)理論。這兩項研究都是21世紀人類福祉危機領域頗具影響力的發現。在接受《財富》雜志采訪時,兩人還提到了喬納森?海特的研究,后者認為智能手機成癮與青少年抑郁存在關聯;布蘭奇弗勞爾還引用了哈佛大學教授羅伯特?帕特南在世紀之交提出的著名觀點:美國人“獨自打保齡球”的現象與日俱增。
布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,他曾與帕特南探討過為什么社會孤立問題變得愈發嚴重,這個問題在2000年被人們首次發現。“實際情況是,人們根本不再去打保齡球,不再去泳池游泳,不再約會,不再有性生活,不再參與各類社交活動……局面已經失控。”布蘭奇弗勞爾呼吁人們關注當下的狀況:“我認為這個問題的潛在影響是巨大的、長期的,且具有全球性。”
走出“駝峰”困境
從歷史上來看,美國人群的心理絕望(通常表現為抑郁癥狀、持續悲傷或絕望感,以及普遍的心理困擾)呈“駝峰形”曲線變化:在成年初期逐漸上升,中年時期達到峰值,之后在晚年逐漸下降。然而,布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森名為《美國年輕勞動者絕望感上升》(Rising Young Worker Despair in the United States)的研究發現,自20世紀90年代以來,這個規律發生了根本性改變。布蘭奇弗勞爾對《財富》說:“如今,這條曲線呈下降趨勢,即絕望感隨年齡增長而降低。”
1993—2023年的《行為風險因素監測系統》(BRFSS)、2008—2023年的《全國藥物使用與健康調查》(NSDUH),以及多項大型全國性調查均證實,在職年輕人群體的絕望感正大幅上升。這意味著,總體而言,勞動者年齡越小,出現心理困擾的案例就越多。如今,絕望感并非在中年達到峰值,而是隨年齡增長穩步下降。
布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,這一發現讓他尤為震驚,因為就在2021年,他還發表過一篇論文,將中年危機的“駝峰形”規律描述為“社會科學領域全球最重要的規律之一,至少在它失效前是這樣”。
美國國家經濟研究局的這份論文指出,盡管年輕勞動者面臨的困擾不斷加劇,但原本中年時期出現的絕望感“駝峰”,如今僅存在于失業或無法工作的美國人群體中;家庭主婦、學生和退休人員的絕望感則保持平穩。這表明,當前危機主要集中在年輕勞動者群體中,它并非是一種能夠對所有年齡段人群都產生同等影響的普遍趨勢。
研究人員在報告中寫道:“如今心理絕望感正隨年齡的增長而下降,原因在于40歲以下勞動者,尤其是25歲以下勞動者的心理健康狀況近期出現了下滑。”不同數據源和年齡段人群均出現了這一上升趨勢,但在女性和在職人群中尤為顯著,失業或經濟活動參與度低的人群則未出現這一情況。
大衰退的陰影仍在?
盡管該論文主要證實了這一趨勢的存在及其變化幅度,并未明確其確切原因,但它指出了可能導致這一現象的更廣泛社會經濟因素:就業不穩定性的加劇、勞動者工作掌控權和自主權的減弱、技術變革加速與職場數字化監控趨嚴、工資漲幅相對生活成本停滯不前,以及集體議價能力減弱。穩定就業傳統預期的破滅,加上“零工經濟”不穩定性的上升,亦可能讓年輕勞動者感到格外脆弱,甚至陷入絕望。
布賴森對《財富》說,盡管“有些人并不認同”,但他們的研究顯示,年輕勞動者絕望感的上升“始于大衰退結束后不久”,具體在2012至2014年期間。批評者認為,社會對心理健康話題抵觸情緒的降低,導致調查數據中絕望感水平的上升,但布蘭奇弗勞爾和布賴森引用了一系列確鑿數據作為反駁,例如自殺率上升、進食障礙住院人數增加、肥胖率攀升以及社交退縮現象加劇,這些都是年輕人真正感到絕望的有力證據。布賴森說:“目前有行為可以佐證‘年輕人心理健康狀況一直在下滑’這一核心觀點。”
當被問及這一現象與 “勞動力市場滯后效應”(由奧利弗?布蘭查德和拉里?薩默斯在1986年一篇具有開創性的論文中提出)是否存在相似性時,布賴森表示認同,并透露他也曾使用過這一術語。布蘭查德和薩默斯的其中一個共識在于,失業(尤其是經濟衰退后的失業)可能會留下“永久性創傷”。布賴森補充道,他還對其他與主觀幸福感相關的“創傷效應”產生了興趣,例如出生在經濟衰退時期,或父母出生在經濟衰退時期可能帶來的影響。(彼得森國際經濟研究所所長亞當?波森最近在彭博社Odd Lots播客中指出,盡管 “滯后效應”和“勞動力市場創傷”受到廣泛關注,但很多經濟學家在大衰退后的數據分析中并未發現相關證據。)
美國銀行全球研究部(Bank of America Global Research)會定期關注失業趨勢,包括年輕勞動者的失業情況。該機構近期對美國人口普查局(U.S. Census Bureau)數據的分析顯示,年輕勞動者的失業率始終高于平均水平,更值得關注的是,2022年以來,應屆畢業生的失業率已超過整體失業率。美國銀行研究所(Bank of America Institute)對年輕勞動者的處境進行了更全面的解讀:“全球約有 2.89億年輕人既未通過工作積累職業經驗,也未通過參與教育或職業培訓項目提升技能,他們的經濟收入也因此受到了制約。”
此外,斯坦福大學開展了一項由頂尖人工智能研究員埃里克?布林約爾松主導的開創性研究。研究結果顯示,自2022年末以來,年輕人群被招聘到高度人工智能自動化崗位的比例有所下降。美國人力資源管理協會(SHRM)的年度心理健康調查也提供了佐證。該協會首席人力資源官吉姆?林克向《財富》透露,他們并未將其定義為 “勞動者絕望”,而是稱之為“職場幸福感”。調查顯示,除2021年因“疫苗帶來的喜悅”出現的一次性提升外,其余年份中,約67%的勞動者稱自己的幸福感較疫情前有所下降。林克補充道:“如果是年輕人,他們的幸福感評分會更低。”
駝峰變成“勾”
布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,盡管他研究這一課題已有多年,但此前并未發現這種可追溯至20世紀90年代的趨勢,一方面是因為數據不夠完整,另一方面是他曾以為這是與疫情相關的臨時現象。然而,在閱讀了簡?滕格的一篇采訪后,他重新梳理了數據。結果,他驚呼“‘天啊’……很明顯,這一趨勢在2020年前就已出現,新冠疫情顯然起到了推波助瀾的作用,但我認為人們此前并未意識到這一點”。
這一發現促使他在2024年與布賴森、徐曉偉(音譯)共同參與了美國國家經濟研究局的論文。在論文中,他們首次將已然確立的中年危機“駝峰形”規律,與2019年后年輕人絕望感激增的現象進行對比。數據圖表不再呈現 “駝峰” 形態,而是更像一個倒置的對勾,在最左側達到峰值后向右逐漸下降。布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,正是這張美國數據圖表,促使聯合國主動與他取得聯系,隨后邀請他參與全球范圍內的絕望感問題研究。
英國的佐證數據同樣觸目驚心。布蘭奇弗勞爾表示,各個學科領域花了不少時間才達成了一致的數據口徑,例如,醫療從業者傾向于用“心理健康”描述這一問題,而經濟學家則更常用“幸福感”,但“在痛苦感數據中,這一趨勢始終十分明顯”。在研究團隊提出了精準的調查問題之后,即“過去30天里,自己心理健康狀況不佳的日子有多少?”,結論變得確鑿無疑。布蘭奇弗勞爾說,由此生成的數據圖表 “讓我震驚不已”。
布賴森指出,按照所學,經濟學家會用工作產生的金錢性回報(金錢和非金錢經濟收益)來衡量工作的好壞,而心理學家以及越來越多的行為經濟學家會采用“工作價值”這一概念,也就是某種無法僅用經濟收益來衡量的東西。在接受《財富》采訪時,他提到了以“需求層次理論”而聞名的亞伯拉罕?馬斯洛,并指出“人的幸福感與自我實現高度相關”,而自我實現意味著自己有能力去追求那些能定義自身價值的目標。在我們所處的社會中,對很多人而言,這種能力完全取決于工作”。布賴森表示,“可想而知”,年輕人群工作崗位質量的下降正對其幸福感產生顯著影響,但他也補充說,由于缺乏進一步的研究,這個觀點仍屬于推測。
有趣的是,這兩位作者指出,年輕勞動者心理健康下滑并非源于工資的下降。事實上,年輕人與年長者的工資比率有所上升,實際工資也在增長。然而,其他成本的上漲導致了絕望感,例如住房、醫保的相對價格,以及學生債的攀升。與此同時,年輕人的健康狀況也在惡化,社會孤立和肥胖問題愈發嚴重,自殺率持續上升。無獨有偶,自21世紀10年代中期以來,各類主流調查數據均顯示年輕人的心理健康狀況在不斷惡化。布蘭奇弗勞爾向《財富》透露,如排除工資不滿或失業這兩個因素,我們可以得出一個結論:年輕勞動者本質上是在表達“這份工作很差”。
美國國家經濟研究局的這項研究傳遞出一個重要信號,而且也引發了聯合國的高度重視:全球年輕勞動者正處于危機之中,絕望感從中年群體向青年群體轉移,這既是公共衛生緊急事件,也是經濟緊急事件。布蘭奇弗勞爾證實,達特茅斯學院與聯合國將于10月底在新罕布什爾州聯合舉辦一場研討會,喬納森?海特、羅伯特?帕特南等學者將作為嘉賓出席。
布賴森還向《財富》提出了另一個推測:年輕人對自身職業前景充滿懷疑,而這種懷疑在很大程度上是合理的。“當下的時代有其特殊性……目前,尤其是年輕人,正遭到一系列問題的沖擊,這意味著他們無法像前幾代人那樣有把握。”(財富中文網)
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
The term “quarter-life crisis” is a millennial invention, referring to young adults’ period of anxiety, uncertainty, and self-doubt as they transition into adulthood. Introduced into the zeitgeist by Alexandra Robbins and Abby Wilner in 2001 for their book, Quarterlife Crisis: The Unique Challenges of Life in Your Twenties, the concept was met with mixed reactions at the time, from Katie Couric’s skepticism to Oprah Winfrey’s empathy.
Gen Z knows this feeling all too well. From chronic struggles with burnout to a pragmatic, even skeptical take on how to lead their careers, the generation that entered the workforce during the age of quiet quitting has come to exemplify the quarter-life crisis. But what if this is the new norm, and the midlife crisis is going extinct the way other trappings of the 20th century have, like dial-up internet and Kodak film? What if Gen Z has giant, macroeconomically valid reasons for being plunged into a collective quarter-life crisis?
A provocative working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research has discovered exactly that: Young people are now experiencing much higher levels of “despair” than those in midlife and older age, reversing the longstanding generational pattern of a “hump-shaped” relationship between mental despair and age. To sum: Way back when, you were supposed to be full of despair in middle age, not in adolescence or early adulthood. Economists David Blanchflower of Dartmouth College and the University of Glasgow, and Alex Bryson of University College London, are unequivocal: This is nothing less than the “disappearance” of the traditional midlife crisis.
Instead, they found the quarter-life crisis is very real, and Gen Z is struggling by historical standards (although they do not use the term “quarter-life crisis”). The decline in mental health among young people, they write, is “particularly evident for young people ages 12-25, and especially young women.” What’s more—and what sets Blanchflower and Bryson’s research apart from so much other relevant work in this area—is it’s the first study to directly link youth despair to what’s happening in the labor market. Bryson noted that it’s just been put out as a discussion paper and is yet to be peer-reviewed.
When reached for comment by Fortune, Blanchflower described being “freaked” out by what his research is showing: “Suddenly young workers look to be in big trouble.” The economist admits he had “never really heard the phrase” quarter-life crisis before, but he “might well have used it” if he had. Still, he was forthright. “Now, both absolutely and relatively, the young are worse off … [it used to be] true that your happiness was going to decline in midlife, but that’s all changed.”
In a separate interview, Bryson agreed the findings do support a quarter-life-crisis thesis in the sense that big issues are facing young people. He cited a speculative but striking quote from their research about how “things have moved against people at that time in their lives, when they’re looking to build careers and move on and acquire property and all the things … the ladder-type things.”
“Moving on up the ladder, it feels as if, perhaps, for some of them, somebody’s removed some of the rungs on that ladder.” Bryson added that he has not seen research directly supportive of this sentiment.
Bryson said they’ve found “workers are always more mentally healthy than non-workers … But there’s a big change in what’s going on for young people. They’re getting worse relative to the non-workers, amongst the young only.” He clarified that they’ve found this isn’t happening to people over 40 years old, “but it is happening if you’re below 40 years of age, and it’s increasingly so amongst the very young, those under 25.”
Blanchflower and Bryson’s cite Jean Twenge‘s research that “the work ethic itself among the young has plummeted,” along with Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s “Deaths of Despair,” both influential findings of a well-being crisis in the 21st century. In interviews with Fortune, both Blanchflower and Bryson also cited the work of Jonathan Haidt, who has argued for a link between smartphone addiction and youth depression, while Blanchflower also cited Harvard professor Robert Putnam and his famous observation at the turn of the century that Americans were increasingly “bowling alone.”
Blanchflower said he’s been talking to Putnam about how the problem of social isolation, first identified in 2000, is getting worse. “The answer is people aren’t bowling at all. They’re not going to the swimming pool. They’re not dating. They’re not having sex. They’re not doing things … The horse is bolted.” Blanchflower urged people to pay attention to what’s happening: “I think the potential consequences of this are huge, long-lasting and global.”
Getting over the hump
Historically, mental despair in the US—typically characterized by symptoms of depression, persistent sadness or hopelessness, and general psychological distress—followed a “hump-shaped” curve: it increased through early adulthood, peaked in middle age, and then declined in later years. But Blanchflower and Bryson’s research, titled “Rising Young Worker Despair in the United States,” finds that this pattern has fundamentally changed since the 1990s. “Now the function slopes down,” Blanchflower told Fortune, “so despair declines in age.”
Drawing on an extensive range of nationally representative data sources—including the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS, 1993-2023), the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH, 2008-2023), as well as multiple large national surveys—the researchers document a dramatic rise in despair among young people who are active in the labor force. This means in general, the younger the worker, the higher their level of reported mental distress, with despair now declining steadily with age instead of peaking in midlife.
Blanchflower said he was particularly struck by this finding because as recently as 2021, he wrote a paper describing the midlife crisis hump-shaping as “one of the most important patterns in the world, in social science, and it’s like, well, until it isn’t.”
While young workers face a rising tide of distress, the original midlife “hump” of despair persists only among Americans who are unemployed or unable to work, and remains flat for homemakers, students, and retirees, according to the NBER paper. This points to a crisis concentrated among the young and employed—not a general trend affecting all cohorts equally.
“The reason that mental despair now declines in age is because of the recent decline in the mental health of workers under the age of 40 and especially those under 25,” they write. The rise is seen across different datasets and demographic groups, but is especially pronounced among women and those with jobs, rather than unemployed or economically inactive individuals.
The ghosts of the Great Recession?
Although the paper primarily establishes the existence and scale of the shift, rather than pinning down exact causes, it points to wider social and economic factors that may be contributing: rising job insecurity, diminished worker control and autonomy, rapid technological change and close digital monitoring in the workplace, stagnating wages relative to living costs, and the weakening of collective bargaining power. The loss of traditional expectations around steady employment and the rise of “gig” economy precarity may also leave younger workers feeling especially vulnerable—despairing, really.
Bryson told Fortune that, although “some people don’t agree,” their research suggests this rise in young worker despair began “some time not long after the Great Recession,” specifically the years between 2012 and 2014. Critics say the decreasing stigma around discussing mental health has led to elevated findings of despair in survey data, but Blanchflower and Bryson cite hard data around rising rates of suicide, hospitalization for eating disorders, rising obesity, and social withdrawal as strong evidence of genuine despair among young people. “There are behaviors to support the underlying proposition that the mental health of the young has been declining,” Bryson said.
When asked about similarities to the concept of labor-market hysteresis, introduced by Olivier Blanchard and Larry Summers in a groundbreaking 1986 paper, Bryson agreed, saying he’s also used that phrase. Among other things, Blanchard and Summers argued “permanent scars” can result from unemployment, particularly in the wake of recessions. Bryson added that he’s become intrigued with other “scarring effects associated with subjective well-being,” say from being born into a recession, or having parents who were born into a recession. (Adam Posen, President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, recently noted on Bloomberg’s Odd Lots podcast that despite extensive attention paid to hysteresis and labor-market scarring, many economists looked for it in the data after the Great Recession and were unable to find it.)
Bank of America Global Research regularly looks at trends in unemployment, including for young workers. A recent analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data shows the unemployment rate is always higher for young workers, but more tellingly, since 2022 the rate for recent graduates has risen above the overall unemployment rate. The Bank of America Institute offered a more comprehensive view of the situation for young workers: “some 289 million young people globally are neither gaining professional experience through a job nor developing skills by participating in an educational or vocational program, limiting economic gains.”
Subsequently, a first-of-its-kind study by Stanford, led by cutting-edge AI researcher Erik Brynjolfsson, has found that since late 2022, fewer young people are being hired into occupations that are heavily exposed to automation by AI. There is also corroborating evidence from the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), which conducts an annual mental health survey. Jim Link, chief human resources officer for SHRM, told Fortune in an interview that they don’t frame this issue as “worker despair” but rather “well-being at work.” Their survey finds that essentially 67% of workers reported worse well-being than before the pandemic for every year except 2021, when “vaccine joy” was a one-off booster. And “if you were a young person,” Link added, “your scores were worse.”
The hump shape becomes a check mark
Blanchflower described how, even though he’s been studying this topic for years, he hadn’t previously spotted this pattern stretching back to the 1990s because the data was patchy; besides, he had assumed it was a pandemic-related phenomenon. But after reading an interview with Jean Twenge, he went back and “started to look at the data. And I went, ‘Oh, good lord’ … It was clear that it had started before 2020 and that Covid obviously made it worse, but I think people hadn’t recognized it.”
This led to a 2024 NBER paper with Bryson and Xiaowei Xu, when they first contrasted the more traditional “hump shape” of the established midlife crisis with the post-2019 surge in youth despair. The chart doesn’t look like a hump anymore, but more like an upside-down check mark, peaking on the left side and going down and to the right. His U.S. chart specifically, he said, prompted a phone call from the United Nations, which would later engage him to work on studying the despair issue globally.
The supporting evidence in the UK was also stark. Blanchflower said it took time for different disciplines to get their data to be consistent, as medical professionals have tended to describe the issue in terms of “mental health” whereas economists have tended to use “happiness,” but “it was always clear in the unhappiness data.” It really locked in for him when they asked the right question: “Over the last 30 days, how many of those were bad mental health days?” The chart that resulted “made me fall over,” Blanchflower said.
Bryson said economists are trained to think of job quality in terms of the pecuniary rewards from work (money and non-monetary financial benefits), whereas psychologists, and a growing number of behavioral economists, point to “the value of work,” or something that is not only estimated in terms of economic benefits. In conversation with Fortune, he referenced Abraham Maslow, famous for his “hierarchy of needs” and how “people’s well-being is very strongly linked to self-actualization, the ability to pursue goals that make them who they are. And for lots of us in our societies, that’s really about work.” Bryson said it’s “conceivable” that the declining quality of jobs for the young is particularly impacting their well-being, adding he considers this to be speculative, absent further research.
Curiously, the authors note the declining mental health of young workers is not driven by a decline in wages, as the ratio of the youth wage to older workers has increased; real wages have also been on the rise. But other costs have added to despair: the relative prices of housing, healthcare, and student debt have risen. Meanwhile, health has worsened, with increases measured in both social isolation and obesity. Youth suicide rates are rising. These factors coincide with a worsening of reported mental health across major survey instruments since the mid-2010s. Blanchflower told Fortune that, once you rule out dissatisfaction with wages or unemployment, it adds up to a conclusion that young workers are basically saying “this job sucks.”
The NBER study sends a strong message, and it’s one the UN is taking seriously: The world’s young workers are in crisis, and the shift in despair from midlife to youth represents both a public health and an economic emergency. Blanchflower confirmed that Dartmouth and the UN are co-hosting a symposium in New Hampshire in late October, with guests including Jonathan Haidt and Robert Putnam.
Bryson offered Fortune another speculative observation: that young people are full of skepticism, much of it justified, about their career prospects. “There’s something special about this moment … At the moment, there are a bunch of things that young people in particular are being hit with, and it means that they can’t be as certain as previous generations.”